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What if living in a relatively trustworthy society was sufficient to blindly trust strangers? In this paper we interpret 
generalized trust as a learning process and analyse the trust game paradox in light of the replicator dynamics. Given that 
trust inevitably implies doubts about others, we assume incomplete information and study the dynamics of trust in 
buyer-supplier purchase transactions. Considering a world made of “good” and “bad” suppliers, we show that the trust 
game admits a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: buyers may trust strangers if, on the whole, it is not too risky to do 





Experimental  studies  report  that  generalized  social  trust,  i.e.  the  willingness  to  trust 
strangers, is significant (e.g., Berg et al. 1995, Ortmann et al. 2000, Cox 2004) and differ from one 
country to the next (e.g., Fukuyama 1995, Knack and Keefer 1997). Generalized trust also oscillates 
between cohorts (e.g., Putnam 2000, Glaeser et al 2000, Alesina and la Ferrara 2000), between 
cities of different sizes (Yamagishi et al. 1998, Tsuji and Harihara 2002) and between social strata 
(Yosano and Hayashi 2005). Englemann and Normann (2010), in an experiment on the minimum 
effort game, have found that recent immigrants behave according to the standards of their home 
country, but that with time tend to behave according to the standards of the host country. This 
suggests that, contrary to findings that trust is an anchored cultural inheritance (Uslaner 2004), an 
individual may learn to trust or to distrust strangers when changing their environment. The literature 
has paid scant attention to the question of learning to trust, and idiosyncratic subjects are usually 
described as consistent in their propensity to trust over time (e.g., Katz and Rotter 1969, Uslaner 
2002, Bjornskov 2006). An individual changing to a different social environment or a social policy 
modifying a social environment may however influence the propensity to trust strangers.  Our main 
hypothesis  in  this  paper  is  that individuals  behave  according  to  their  general  beliefs  about  the 
trustworthiness  of  their  partners.  We  assume  trust  is  not  related  to  a  set  trait  of  individual 
personality  (Ulsaner  2002)  but  rather  to  a  trusting  culture  grounded  on  social  and  political 
institutions (Putnam 1993, 2000). This presupposes that trust is inextricably linked to generalized 
trustworthiness in society. If nearly everyone is trustworthy then trusting a stranger is a profitable 
bet; if nearly everyone is untrustworthy then it is clearly not.
1 
 We  consider a  trust  game paradox  as  defined  by  Kreps  (1990). The  only  subgame perfect 
equilibrium of this game is the situation where the trustor withholds trust. This is a social paradox 
since without trust, social exchange is more costly. Kreps (1990) and Kandori (1992) argue that 
repetition is the natural solution to lack of trust in this game.  If tit-for-tat strategies are followed, 
and  if  agents  are  sufficiently  patient,  a  trusting  relationship  can  be  established  as  a  Nash 
equilibrium. The assumption of different payoff functions, say of the inequity  aversion type 
described in Fehr and Schmidt  (1999), may also be conducive to trust.
2 Considering an indirect 
evolutionary approach, Güth and Kliemt (1994), Güth et al. (2000) and Ahn and Esarey (2008) 
show that trust is established as soon as a detection-type mechanism which reveals trustworthiness 
is implemented. Bicchieri et al. (2004) and Bravo and Tamburino (2009) offer a direct evolutionary 
analysis of trust. The former provide a dynamic replicator simulation model showing that within a 
homogeneous population, trust exchange may emerge spontaneously; the latter study reputation 
mechanisms and show that generalized trust is present in systems where information regarding the 
past behaviour of agents can spread sufficiently. 
Complementarily  to  this  literature,  we  are  interested  in  explaining  generalized  trust  under  the 
condition of pure anonymity. We discard both the possibility of repeating the interaction with an 
identified partner and, more generally, any available detection mechanism. Like Bicchieri et al. 
(2004),  we  reconsider  two  of  the  standard  trust  games’  strongest  assumptions:  (i)  common 
knowledge; and (ii) complete information. We suggest that individuals have the ability to learn 
“good” strategies from observing what worked well in the past, and we consider that they make 
their  choice  with  information  asymmetries,  where  beliefs  are  relevant.  This  translates  into 
considering an evolutionary setting where players learn to trust strangers in case it proves to be a 
                                                 
1 Note that many contributions study determinants of generalized trust by focusing on the correlation between generalized trust and variables such as 
democracy (e.g., Bjornskov 2006), political participation (e.g., Montoro and Puchades 2010), professional associations (e.g. Sabatini 2009), economic 
2 Fehr (2009), in a synthesis of leading achievements in neuro-economics and behavioural economics, shows that trust may be explained as the 
conjunction of three elements: beliefs about other people’s trustworthiness, risk preferences, and social preferences (in particular, betrayal aversion). 3 
profitable bet.
3 A key question is then to ask when it is a profitable bet and when it is not. We focus 
on the behaviour of trustors and consider that trustworthiness is a type that implies a trustee’s belief 
in the value of reciprocating trust (Cook and Cooper 2003, Cochard et al. 2004), Ahn and Esarey 
2008). “Good” and “bad” trustees are in a fixed proportion in the population and we analyse how 
generalized trust comes to pervade a community of trustors.
4  Because a class of agents may have a 
larger strategy set, acting as both trustees and as trustors, we then enlarge our perspecti ve to the 
situation where there is also a third type of player deciding alternatively whether to trust or not, and 
whether to honour or betray the trust. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main characteristics of the trust game 
and its outcomes. Section 3 analyses the evolutionary outcome of the game using the replicator 
dynamics. We consider first that the roles of the players are set, and then turn to a setting where 
some players have mixed roles. Section 4 concludes. All proof is relegated to the appendix. 
2 The trust game 
 
We consider trust exchange between two players involved in a transaction, a buyer and a 
supplier
5. Their trust relationship concerns for example the quality or the delivery of a product. Our 
approach applies however to other transactions and can be illustrative of employment relationship 
between an employer and an employee as studied by Kreps (1993) or of micro -credit relationship 
between a lender and a borrower as studied by Karlan (2005). We  denote respectively 1 and 2 the 
buyer and the supplier. The buyer chooses to trust or not the supplier delivering the product and the 
latter has an incentive to cheat. For example, the supplier could try to sell a good of lower quality 
than the one expected, or he could not deliver the product on time. Assume there are two types of 
suppliers: good suppliers (denoted
G 2 ) and bad suppliers (denoted
B 2 ). The first are in proportion p, 
the second in proportion 1-p. When the game starts the buyer does not know what type of supplier 
she is transacting with, but both players know their own type. It follows that in a prior move, nature 
(denoted N) determines the supplier’s type. Once supplier type is assigned, then the players play the 
game depicted in figure 1. We assume that after observing the game’s outcome, players change 
behaviour, imitating actions that yield higher benefits.  
The game proceeds as follow. The buyer moves first and chooses between two strategies
6: mistrust 
(M) or trust (T). If she mistrusts the supplier, the game ends. If the buyer trusts the supplier, it is the 
supplier’s turn to move. The supplier’s strategy space encompasses two possible actions: to honour 
the trust (H), or exploit it (E). Note that in the figure, numbers in brackets are probabilities of nature 
moves and the terms at the root of the tree represent as usual, the payoffs of the players.  
 
[voir Annexe Figure 1.] 
 
To obtain the trust game we assume:  1 c > 0 >  1 b ,   2 c >  2 b > 0. As in Gautschi (1999), the two types 
of supplier can be distinguished via small differences in their reward  2 c . If the supplier honours the 
trust placed by the buyer, fairness considerations increase his payoff  2 c  by . More precisely, if the 
supplier is a good supplier, his additional payoff is    2 b - 2 c  which may be interpreted as a taste 
                                                 
3 We examine the game using the replicator dynamics model. The underlying idea is that the frequency of a strategy increases exactly when it yields 
payoffs above the average. To justify this modelling choice, recall that Schlag (1998) argues that the limiting case of a learning process that depends 
on imitation yields the replicator dynamics. Also, Erev and Roth (1998) show that some of the learning models in the psychology literature are 
approximations of the replicator dynamics model. 
4 We are not interested in this paper on the evolution of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness could spread in a population as a result of learning or of 
evolutionary pressure. This question will be analysed later in this research project. 
5 For readability purpose we assume supplier is a he and buyer is a she. 
6 From an evolutionary perspective, agents are identified with a strategy, and the relative frequency of a strategy within the population is the 
proportion of agents that adopt it. 4 
for reciprocity. If he is bad, his additional payoff is defined by    2 b - 2 c  which may be interpreted 
as a taste for egoism. It results that if the supplier is a good supplier, he honours trust in the 
transaction; if he is a bad supplier, he betrays trust. 
The outcome when the buyer mistrusts the supplier constitutes the reference situation. In this case, 
the gains are normalized to 0. This is the status quo point, i.e. the state that exists before trust 
emerges. 
Before considering evolution dynamics, we start focusing on the case where players are rational. 
Given our setting, player 1 only chooses T if her expected payoff is larger than when choosing M. 
Therefore, player 1 places trust if the following inequality holds:  p > 1 1 1 b /(c b )  , and then, when 
p exceeds the ratio of a potential loss due to unjustified trust ( 1 b  ) and a potential gain due to a 
justified trust  11 (c b )  . This ratio corresponds in fact to the risk to a buyer of placing trust (Snijders 
and Keren, 1999). And she will not place trust if p is smaller than  1 1 1 b /(c b )  .  Two Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium competes: (a) or p >  1 1 1 b /(c b )   and player 1 chooses T while player 2 chooses 
H if he is a good supplier, and E if he is a bad supplier; (b) or p <  1 1 1 b /(c b )   and then, player 1 
chooses M and no trust relationship takes place.  
3 The evolutionary dynamics 
3.1 Trust game with fixed role 
We start focusing on the case where buyers and suppliers are fixed in the role of trustor and 
trustee, they are randomly matched to play the game. Let  2G p  (respectively 2B p ) be the proportion of 
players 
G 2  (respectively
B 2 ) choosing H and 1- 2G p  (respectively 1- 2B p ) the proportion of players 
G 2  (respectively 
B 2 ) choosing E. Also, let  1 p  (respectively 1- 1 p ) be the proportion of players 1 
choosing  T  (respectively  M).  Following  Taylor  and  Jonker  (1978)  and  Zeeman  (1980),  the 
distribution of strategies in the population over time can be described by the replicator dynamics: 
 
i p  =  i p
m
ii []       i = 1, 
G 2 , 
B 2 .       (1) 
 
where  i  is the expected gain of player i and 
m
i   is the average gain for the i-population. The 
replicator dynamics describes the variation in the proportion of players of each type  i within the 
population in the next generation. It means that when the expected gain of player i increases (in 
relation  to  the  average  gain  in  the  i-population)  the  growth  rate  i i p / p  also  increases  and  more 
players from the i-population will imitate i’s action.
7  
Two remarks immediately follow. First, if a pure strategy is absent in the initial population, it will 
never  appear in  the  game. Second, the deterministic system  (1) takes into account  that  certain 
strategies may disappear over time. The possibility of extinction accounts for the idea that certain 
populations are invaded by competing behaviours. However, strategies that disappear can reappear 
if the environment becomes favourable again (Gintis 2000).  
Let us first analyse the behaviour of player 1. We next apply the same reasoning to the other player. 
Choosing T, player 1 will: (i) with a probability  2G pp , interact with a player 
G 2  playing H, enabling 
player 1 to get  1 c ; (ii) with a probability   2G p(1 p )  interact with a player 
G 2  playing E, enabling 
player 1 to get  1 b ; (iii) with a probability   2B (1 p)p   interact with a player 
B 2  playing H, enabling 
                                                 
7 Several authors define alternative learning models, but alternative adaptation rules lead inexorably towards the replicator dynamics (see among 
others Gale et al. 1995; Björnested and Weibull 1996). The axiomatic of the learning rules follows this trend by determining the conditions that 
induce the replicator dynamics (Börgers and Sarin 1997); the axioms that are introduced define the functional form of a desirable learning rule. Schlag 
(1998) is the only one that proposes a derivation of the replicator dynamics on the basis of an individual behaviour chosen optimally. 5 
player 1 to get  1 c ; and (iv) with a probability  2B (1 p)(1 p )  , interact with a player 
B 2  playing E, 
enabling player 1 to get  1 b . 
We deduce that the expected gain of player 1 is: 
1  =  2G 1 pp c + 2G 1 p(1 p )b  + 2B 1 (1 p)p c  + 2B 1 (1 p)(1 p )b   
 
and the average gain of all players 1 is: 
m
1  =  1 2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1 p [pp c p(1 p )b (1 p)p c (1 p)(1 p )b ]        + 1 (1 p )0  . 
 
It follows that the replicator equation describing the rate of growth of  1 p  in the population is given 
by: 
1 p =  11 p (1 p )  2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1 [pp c p(1 p )b (1 p)p c (1 p)(1 p )b ]        . 
 
By analogy, the growth rate of  2G p  and of  2B p  are: 
2G p  =  2G 2G 1 2 2 p (1 p )p (c b )   and  2B p = 2B 2B 1 2 2 p (1 p )p (c b )   . 
 
In order to study evolutionary dynamics, we examine the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the 
game. Recall that a strategy 
* r = 
* * *
1 2G 2B (p ,p ,p )  is said to be ESS if it is a best reply to itself and it is a 
better reply to any alternative best reply  μ than μ is to itself (Maynard Smith and Price 1973). 
Because the game is asymmetric, if 
* r constitutes an ESS, 
* r  is a pure strategy and there is no better 
reply to 
* r  (Selten 1980, 1988). This means in our game that ESS can only be found at the corners 
of the unit cube, that is the 8 potential ESS: (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1) 
and (0,0,0). 
As shown by Gardner and Morris (1991), if  
* r  is an ESS
8, then 
* r  is a dynamic equilibrium which 
is  hyperbolically  stable  with  respect  to  the  dynamics  (1).  In  other  words,  identifying  the  ESS 
translates into identifying dynamic equilibria that are hyperbolically stable. 
 
Definition 1. Let 
* r  be a dynamic equilibrium of the system described by (1) and J the Jacobian of 
the replicator dynamics, 
* r  is said to be hyperbolically stable if all the eigenvalues of J evaluated at 
* r have negative real parts. 
 
Analysis of all cases let us deduce the following result: 







 the replicator dynamics model admits 
(1,1,0) as unique ESS. 
 
This unique ESS depicts the situation where all buyers trust suppliers, good suppliers honour this 
trust and bad ones abuse it. As soon as p > 1 1 1 b /(c b )  > 0, the risk to place trust is sufficiently low 
and the probability that a buyer match a good supplier is high enough for systematic trust. Although 
bad suppliers are encouraged over time systematically to abuse trusting players since this allows 
them to reap higher benefits, the buyers continue trusting given that the expected gain associated to 
strategy M is lower than the expected gain associated with strategy T.  
                                                 
8 Note that for asymmetric games, Selten (1983,1988) proposed the more general concept of limit evolutionarily stable strategy (LESS). The LESS 
reflects the idea that the equilibrium strategy may be seen as the limit of ESS for close perturbed games. In these perturbed games, admissible 
strategies may be required to play some actions with arbitrarily small probability. We use to study the LESS of a game when there is no ESS. This is 
not the case in our model. 6 
We deduce that despite incomplete information, when relations of trust are held, they may spread as 
if  they  were  new  social  norms.  Trust  is  behaviourally  internalized  and  players  reproduce  it 
naturally. This is consistent with the notion of “embeddedness” depicted by Granovetter (1985). 
The  on-going  networks  of  social  relations  between  people  discourage  malfeasance  and  trust  is 
viewed as embedded within social relationships. A key difference is however that embeddedness 
theory focuses on the enhancement of reputation in interpersonal relationships. Trust is portrayed as 
taking  place  locally  first,  within  neighbourhood  relationships,  to  extend  next  to  more  distant 
relationships. Instead, in our approach, individual reputation is secondary. A buyer is not interested 
into  a  particular  seller  but  to  have  information  (in  probability  terms)  about  the  set  of  sellers 
composing the society. If in average sellers are trustable, a buyer will trust anyone, with an accepted 
probability to interact with an egoist. According to this view, individuals do not care about the risk 
of ending in a worse situation than his partner (Ashraf et al., 2003) nor about the risk of being 
abused (Bohnet et Zeckhauser, 2004). As soon as the risk of ending in a worse situation than when 
absent of trust (Ben-Ner et Putterman, 2001), the buyer trusts.  
3.2 The trust game allowing for mixed role  
 
The assumption of fixed roles can be viewed as a limitation given that in the complexity of 
real life, some players may sometimes play both roles. We now introduce a third kind of player who 
can randomly take on either role. We call this player hybrid and denote him with the number 3. 
These players are typically the ones found buying and selling on Internet sites such as priceminister 
or  eBay  and  conform  to  several  situations  involving  trust  transactions.  Considering  again  the 
extensive form game represented in figure 1, the hybrid player can be in first or second position. 
When he is in first position, he has the same strategy space as a buyer. Respectively if he is in 
second position, he has the same strategy space as a supplier and can be of either good or bad type. 
We call a good type hybrid  player 
G 3   and a bad type one
B 3 . We suppose hybrid players are 
behaviourally  consistent  and  we  consider that  if they  trust  as  buyers  they  will  honour  trust  as 
suppliers,  strategies  T  and  H  are  played  by  hybrid  players  proportionally.  This  assumption  is 
consistent with the experimental studies of  Deutsch (1958)  or of  Dubois and Willinger (2007) 
according to  trusting and trustworthy behaviours tend to be displayed by the same agents.
 9  
Introducing this new category of players modifies slightly our game. Now, when it starts, nature 
makes two random moves. First it determines the role of the hybrid player and second, the type of 
supplier. We assume the hybrid player to be buyer or supplier with a probability  1/2. Possible 
random matchings then are: a buyer and a supplier, a hybrid player and a supplier, a buyer and a 
hybrid player.   
In order to study the evolutionary dynamics of this game, we proceed as in the previous case. That 
is, we start determine the replication equation associated to the behaviour of player 1, the difference 
being that now she may match with a player 2 or with a player 3. We proceed by analysing expected 
payoffs of players 2 and 3 which let us, overall, describe the dynamics by a system of five 
differential equations. Solving this system translates into identifying the set of ESS in pure strategy. 
We have 
5 2 = 32 potential ESS and studying the eigenvalues of the Jacobian we deduce that only 
two are ESS. 
 
Proposition 2. In the trust game with hybrid players: 







 the replicator dynamics model admits (1,1,0,1,1) as unique ESS. 
                                                 
9 See also the discussion of Fehr (2009) on the self-reinforcing aspect of trust and trustworthiness. According to this author “the empirical evidence 















 the replicator dynamics model admits (1,1,0,1,0) as unique ESS. 
 
When the proportions of good suppliers and good hybrids are significant within their respective 
populations (i.e. superior to  2 2 1 1 1 (b c b )/(c b )    ), the only stable state in the  population is 
(1,1,0,1,1). In other words, whether they are hybrids or not, all buyers trust and all hybrids and good 
suppliers honour this trust. In this stable state, as in proposition 1, all buyers trust. However, the 
validity condition is now stricter: the proportions of good players must be higher. The principal 
difference between this setting and the previous one is that now, bad suppliers and notably hybrid 
ones honour the trust placed by the buyers. Indeed, when buying, a bad hybrid gets a high benefit 
by trusting because in average, he has a high probability to make a transaction with a supplier that 
will honour trust. As his behaviour when selling is correlated to his behaviour when buying, the 
hybrid supplier honours trust. This allows him to reap a high payoff since he matches only with 
trusting buyers. Given the expected payoff of a hybrid player is the average of what he obtains as a 
buyer and as a supplier, the overall gain is high. Note that when acting as a supplier, if a bad hybrid 
player systematically betrays buyers, he also yields high benefits. However, given consistence in 
behaviour, he never trusts when buying either. It follows that as a buyer he receives a nil benefit 
which balances the benefit he obtains as a supplier. In the long run, this player ends up in a worse 
situation than if he always placed and honoured trust. This effect does not exist for bad suppliers 
that always play second in the game. They never honour trust and this is all the more profitable that 
they match only with trusting buyers.  
If the proportion of good suppliers and of good hybrids within their respective populations is lower 
than  2 2 1 1 1 (b c b )/(c b )    but higher or equal to  1 1 1 b /(c b )  , the game yields another stable 
state with similar characteristics but in which bad hybrids never trust when buying and always 
betray trust when supplying. Indeed for a buyer, given that there are fewer good suppliers, trusting 
them is less profitable. When buying, bad hybrids yield higher benefit on average from mistrusting. 
Because their behaviour is consistent, they always betray buyers when acting as suppliers. This 
allows them to increase their benefits and compensate for lack of benefit when playing as buyers. 
This stable state admits a similarity to proposition 1: all bad players, hybrids or not, always exploit 
trust. Again, the validity condition is more restrictive given that now the proportion of good players 
will be between two bounds: high but not too high. 
Finally note that under the same conditions as in proposition (1) and for any stable state, trust 
relationships regularly take place. Proposition (1) is robust to a setting where some agents have a 
larger strategy space.  
4 Conclusion 
In the absence of a contract and/or an institution guaranteeing some form of social control, 
agents  with  limited knowledge may trust  and learn to  trust  because this  is  simply a  good bet. 
Focusing  on  trust  in  transactions,  we  show  that  buyers  may  trust  indiscriminately  when  the 
proportion of good suppliers is above a given threshold. Bad suppliers continue betraying trusting 
buyers but they are few enough not to undermine generalized trust. This leads us to conclude that a 
trustful  world  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  fully  trustworthy  one.  Introducing  a  third  kind  of 
individual, we analysed whether the introduction of agents playing mixed roles threatens trust. The 
answer is no and our results remain fundamentally similar.  
In our opinion, these preliminary results are important in order to estimate the thresholds that may 
allow for generalized trust to be established in a society. As Nooteboom (2010) shows, trust and 
institutions are both substitutes and complements. Contracts support reliance but can be destructive 
to trust, and one can argue that contracts may be used in order to attain a certain threshold ensuring 
trustworthiness. Complementing the work of Zucker (1986) and Nooteboom (2002), a threshold-8 
based analysis would allow for a better understanding of the design of contracts and notably the best 
timing for lasting trust to be established. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The Jacobian of the replicator dynamics at any point r =  1 2G 2B (p ,p ,p )can be expressed as follows: 
J(r) = 
1 1 1 2G 1 2B
2G 1 2G 2G 2G 2B
2B 1 2B 2G 2B 2B
p / p p / p p / p
p / p p / p p / p
p / p p / p p / p
      

      
       
, 
and therefore: 11 
 
J(r)=
1 2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2G 2G 2 2 2G 1 2 2
2B 2B 2 2 2B 1 2 2
(1 2p )[pp c p(1 p )b (1 p)p c (1 p)(1 p )b ] p (1 p )p(c b) p (1 p )(1 p)(c b )
p (1 p )(c b ) (1 2p )p (c b ) 0
p (1 p )(c b ) 0 (1 2p )p (c b )
              

    
     
 
 
According to definition (1), in order to characterize the ESS we should study the eigenvalues of the matrix J 
in each of the 8 points that are candidates.  
Let 






J(1,1,1) 0 (c b ) 0
0 0 (c b )
 

   
   
. 
 
The eigenvalues are:  1 c  ,  22 (c b )   ,  22 (c b )   . They are all negative (which shows that (1,1,1) is 
hyperbolically stable) if: 
1 c > 0,  22 (c b )  > 0 and  22 (c b )  > 0.  
The condition on the gains of 
B 2  (i.e.  22 (c b )  > 0) contradicts one of the assumption of the trust game 
and we deduce that (1,1,1) is not an ESS. In the same manner, we show that (1,0,1) and (1,0,0) are also not 
ESS. 





[pc (1 p)b ] 0 0
J(1,1,0) 0 (c b ) 0
0 0 (c b )
   





and this point is an ESS because conditions on the gains of the two types of player 2 do not contradict the 









Regarding (0,1,1), (0,1,0), (0,0,1) and (0,0,0), we obtain respectively: 
 
1 c 0 0








11 pc (1 p)b 0 0








11 pb (1 p)c 0 0
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1 b 0 0









For each of those cases, 0 is an eigenvalue and they are not ESS which concludes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 2 
We proceed as in proposition 1, the difference being that now there is a third type of player that may both 
play as buyer or seller. We denote by  3G p  (respectively 3B p ) the proportion of players 
G 3  (respectively
B 3 ) 
choosing T when buying and choosing H when selling. The complement 1- 3G p  (respectively 1- 3B p ) is the 
proportion of players 
G 3  (respectively 
B 3 ) choosing M when buying and E when selling.  
We start determine the replication equation associated to the behaviour of player 1. If she matches a player 2, 
her expected payoff is  2G 1 pp c + 2G 1 p(1 p )b  + 2B 1 (1 p)p c  + 2B 1 (1 p)(1 p )b  and if she matches a player 3, 
her expected payoff is  3G 1 pp c + 3G 1 p(1 p )b  + 3B 1 (1 p)p c  + 3B 1 (1 p)(1 p )b  . Since player 1 matches a player 
2  with  probability  1/2  and  a  player  3  with  a  probability  1/2,  her   expected  payoffs 
is  1  = 2G 3G 1 2G 3G 1 2B 3B 1 2B 3B 1
1
[p(p p )c p(2 p p )b (1 p)(p p )c (1 p)(2 p p )b ]
2
           . 
The  average  gain  of  all  1-players  is 
m
1  =  11 p  + 1 (1 p )0    and  the  growth  rate  of    1 p is  1 p   = 
1 1 1 p (1 p )  = 11 p (1 p )  2G 3G 1 2G 3G 1 2B 3B 1 2B 3B 1
1
[p(p p )c p(2 p p )b (1 p)(p p )c (1 p)(2 p p )b ]
2
            
Consider now player 
G 2 . If he matches with a player 1, his expected payoff is  12 p (c )  . If he matches with 
a player 3, his expected payoff is  3G 2 3B 2 pp (c ) (1 p)p (c )     . Again, given player 
G 2  matches with a 
player  1  with  a  probability 1/2  and  with  a  player  3  with  a  probability 1/2,  his  expected  gain  is  2G  = 
2 1 3G 3B
1
(c )[p pp (1 p)p ]
2
    .  The  average  gain  of  all 
G 2 -players  is
m
2G  = 
2G 2 2G 2 1 3G 3B
1
[p (c ) (1 p )b ][p pp (1 p)p ]
2
        and  the  growth  rate  of    2G p   is  2G p   = 
2G 2G 2 2 1 3G 3B
1
p (1 p ) (c b )[p pp (1 p)p ]
2
     .  Similarly,  we  deduce  that  2B p   = 
2B 2B 2 2 1 3G 3B
1
p (1 p ) (c b )[p pp (1 p)p ]
2
     . 
Finally, consider a hybrid player 
G 3 . If acting as a buyer, his expected payoff 
is 2G 1 pp c + 2G 1 p(1 p )b  + 2B 1 (1 p)p c  + 2B 1 (1 p)(1 p )b  and if acting as a supplier, his expected payoff is 
12 p (c )  . Total expected gain is then 13 
3G  = 1 2 2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1
1
[p (c ) pp c p(1 p )b (1 p)p c (1 p)(1 p )b ]
2
          and we deduce 
m
3G  = 3G 3G p  + 3G 1 2
1
(1 p )p b
2
 . The growth rate of  3G p  is:           
3G p = 3G 3G 1 2 2 2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1
1
p (1 p )[p (c b ) pp c p(1 p )b (1 p)p c (1 p)(1 p )b ]
2
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Similarly, we obtain:        
3B p = 3B 3B 1 2 2 2G 1 2G 1 2B 1 2B 1
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2
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And we deduce that the eigenvalues are negatives if:  
11 (1 p)c (1 p)b    > 0              (2) 
2 c + - 2 b > 0                (3) 
2 c +- 2 b < 0                (4) 
2 c + - 2 b + 11 pc (1 p)b  > 0            (5) 14 
2 c +- 2 b + 11 pc (1 p)b  > 0.            (6) 
 
By assumption, (3) and (4) are always true and (2), (5) and (6) lead to the following inequality: 
p > 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
b c b c b b c b
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c b c b c b
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and we deduce that the eigenvalues are negatives if:  
11 pc (1 p)b  > 0              (7) 
2 c + - 2 b > 0                (8) 
2 c +- 2 b < 0                (9) 
2 c + - 2 b + 11 pc (1 p)b  > 0            (10) 
2 c +- 2 b + 11 pc (1 p)b  < 0.            (11) 
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